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TORTS
William E. Crawford*

Products Liability**
The "Louisiana Products Liability Act" (the Act) was enacted by
Act 64 of 1988 and was codified as Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2800.51
through 2800.59. The Act sets forth the exclusive theories of liability
that can be brought against manufacturers for damage caused by their
products.' Therefore, recovery for damages caused by a product in an
ordinary negligence or redhibition action is precluded.
Circumstances or conduct that will trigger liability of a manufacturer
under the Act constitute fault under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315,2
so that the products action against the manufacturer continues to be in
tort. Thus, all the peripheral characteristics of tort actions not specifically
governed by the Act continue to be applicable, such as comparative
fault, contribution, indemnity, judicial interest, cause-in-fact, proximate
cause, in solido liability, and others not inconsistent with the specific
provisions of the Act.
Superficially, the cause of action established by the Act' sounds very
similar to the traditional products liability cause of action first stated
in Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Insurance Co. 4 However, upon close
analysis of the elements of the cause of action, it becomes evident that
significant changes have been effected in the law of products liability
as set forth under Weber and Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.'
For example, under the Act the damage occasioned by the product must
have arisen out of its "reasonably anticipated use, ' 6 instead of "normal
use." The new term is specifically defined in the Act and suggests a
more restrictive scope of liability than would have attached under the
''normal use" or "foreseeable use" provision.

Copyright 1988, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.

Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
This commentary willbe brief since the Act will be covered thoroughly in a lead
article in a forthcoming issue of this law review.
1. La. R.S. 9:2800.52, as enacted by 1988 La. Acts No. 64.
2. Id.
3. La. R.S. 9:2800.54, as enacted by 1988 La. Acts No. 64.
4. 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971).
5. 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986).
6. La. R.S. 9:2800.53(7), as enacted by 1988 La. Acts No. 64.
*
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The new cause of action is comprised of four theories of liability:
construction or composition, design, warning, and express warranty.7
The warning and construction or composition theories have remained
substantially the same as the Weber and Halphen actions.8
However, the action in design has changed substantially. It now
requires the plaintiff to show an existing alternative design, which was
developed and in being at the time the product left the manufacturer's
control, that could have prevented the claimant's damage. 9 Under section
2800.59 A(3) the defendant may defeat liability by showing that the
existing alternative design was not feasible or economically practicable.
The defendant may also escape liability by showing that he did not
know and in light of existing technology could not have known of the
alternative design established by the plaintiff.'0 This is the traditional
state-of-the-art defense.
The most significant change in products liability law effected by the
Act is in section 2800.59 A(1): the manufacturer shall not be liable if
he did not know and in light of existing technology could not have
known of the dangerous design characteristic that caused the damage.
Traditionally, Louisiana jurisprudence has eliminated the foreseeability
of risk element in products actions." This provision is apparently a
legislative disavowal of that concept. In a sense, proof by the manufacturer under this provision simply trumps the plaintiff's action in
design. The structure of the Act and the plain wording of the provision
allows the manufacturer to take this line of defense and defeat liability
entirely.
Section 2800.59 A(l) apparently has its origin in Halphen, in which
the court stated, "[D]iscouragement to produce new products or to
discover safety improvements will be mitigated by the manufacturer's
ability to defend failure to warn cases, alternative design cases and
alternative product cases on the basis of scientific unknowability and
inability.' 2 The Act, in the Halphen tradition, clearly rejects the notion
that the essential element of strict liability is the irrelevance of foreseeability of risk. The more practical characterization of the distinction
between actions in strict liability and negligence is that a general showing
of reasonable care is not a defense to the action in strict liability. This
distinction remains unchanged by the Act, even though reasonable care
is the particular standard for providing adequate warnings.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

La. R.S. 9:2800.54 B, as enacted by 1988 La. Acts No. 64.
Weber, 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754; Halphen, 484 So. 2d 110.
La. R.S. 9:2800.56, as enacted by 1988 La. Acts No. 64.
La. R.S. 9:2800.59 A (2), as enacted by 1988 La. Acts No. 64.
Halphen, 484 So. 2d at 113.
Id.at 118.
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The Act's express warranty theory of recovery is self-contained and
distinct from the general express warranty action found in the Civil
Code. 3 It is possible that jurisprudence under the Code warranty action
may be relevant. However, since the theory of express warranty is now
one of the exclusive theories of recovery in products liability, the definition of express warranty in the Act, particularly with respect to the
allowance of recovery in cases where the express warranty was made to
a third party, must be derived solely from the Act's provisions.
There seems to be no reason why Louisiana's existing comparative
fault system, whether under Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast 4 or Civil Code
article 2323, should not continue to apply to actions under the Act,
since under the pre-Act jurisprudence the action against a manufacturer
was a form of fault under Article 2315, and remains so in the Act.
The opinion in Ardoin v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co.'5
creates the prospect that the Act is retroactive. In brief, Ardoin states
that if a statute neither creates actions nor abolishes them, but only
changes the burden of proof, then it is procedural, and therefore retroactive in effect. Prior to the Act there existed an action against
manufacturers for damage proximately caused by their unreasonably
dangerous products, and under the Act that action continues to exist,
though it is subject to different requirements of proof on the part of
the plaintiff. In that light, the Act is retroactive. There would, of course,
be the traditional inquiry into legislative intent, including a review, of
the committee hearings on the bill. Such a review will show a considerable
amount of discussion concerning the prospective or retroactive effect of
the bill. But the final outcome must await the actual transcription of
those proceedings, allowing for an evaluation of the legislative intent
revealed as measured against the actual form in which the bill was
ultimately adopted.
The provisions of the Act were derived substantially from House
Bill 711 in the 1983 Regular Session, which was the Louisiana State
Law Institute proposal for a Products Liability Act in that year. Although the elaborate comments contained in the Institute's proposal are
not, strictly speaking, legislative antecedents, they should nonetheless
prove very helpful in interpreting the provisions of the Act.
Civil Code Article 667
Butler v. Baber 6 may have effected deep and significant changes in
the recent jurisprudential application of Louisiana Civil Code article

13.
14.
15.
16.

La.
462
360
529

Civ. Code arts. 2529, 2547.
So. 2d 166 (La. 1985).
So. 2d 1331 (La. 1978).
So. 2d 374 (La. 1988).

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 49

667. Generally, the effect of having an action under article 667 was
very desirable to a plaintiff because it gave him the advantage of the
burden of proof in a strict liability action. The application of article
667 was, however, not only restricted to adjoining land owners, but
was further restricted to damage-causing activities classified as ultrahazardous. The strict liability character of the action thus was consonant
with the common law strict liability action for abnormally dangerous
activities. It is difficult to find clear examples in Louisiana jurisprudence
where strict liability under article 667 was applied to non-ultrahazardous
activity. This does not mean that damage from a non-ultrahazardous
activity was non-actionable, but instead means that the activity was
subject to a negligence standard of care, which, apart from the provisions
of article 667, was the standard ordinarily associated with such activity.
Under Butler, the literal language of the opinion indicates that article
667 liability should attach without proof of negligence fault, requiring
only that damage and causation be proved. While the court points out
that the damage resulted from defendant's dredging operations, there is
no suggestion in the opinion that the dredging operation was ultrahazardous. If liability without fault extends to any activity on property
that damages the neighboring property, anomalous results will occur.
The neighbor spray painting his house with all due care who, nonetheless,
allows spray to drift to his neighbors house and cause damage, is strictly
liable, or liable without fault, or liable without negligence fault. A
stranger spray painting his automobile parked in the street, not on his
own property, whose paint also drifted to the unfortunate victim's
property, would be liable only if negligence were proved.
There is no apparent societal need to apply liability without fault
to the ordinary activities of man that have not been classified as ultrahazardous, things found to import an unreasonable risk of harm
under Loescher v. Parr.7 The rule of Butler will apply not only in the
oil fields, but among all neighboring properties, whether suburbia or
farmland. While it is possible that the court seeks to impose liability
without fault upon all ordinary activities in those environments, it is
hoped that the fabric of strict liability will not be woven to stretch so
far.
Comparative Fault-Assumption Of Risk
Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc."8 abolishes the theory of assumption
of risk and seems to establish comparative fault, which encompasses
both contributory negligence and those circumstances formerly com-

17.
18.

324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975).
521 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1988).

TORTS

1988]

prising assumption of risk, as the sole theory of victim conduct that
reduces recovery. However, it is difficult to abolish a state of mind.
The state of mind constituting traditional assumption of risk is clearly
distinguishable factually from the state of mind and circumstances constituting negligence. *In order to find assumption of risk, the trier of
fact always has been required to step across a sharp line to infer that
the plaintiff had a subjective awareness of a risk he was voluntarily
embracing. That factual distinction will persist even though the Murray
opinion has summarily abolished the legal theory resting upon it.
A better approach may have been to retain the theory of assumption
of risk, but to classify the plaintiffs who assume the risk as negligent,
and thus invoke the effect of comparative fault. The value of that
scheme would lie in the candor of pleading facts constituting the affirmative defense of comparative fault. The bald caption of comparative
fault will be of no effect when pleaded by a defendant unless it is
supported by facts that will invoke the doctrine of comparative fault.
Those facts must constitute either contributory negligence or assumption
of risk, since those two theories remain as the only species of plaintiff
fault cognizable as comparative fault, even victim fault, as set forth in
Loescher v. Parr.'9 The states of mind required for the two theories
are clearly distinct from each other.
The Murray opinion does point out that the plaintiff's awareness
of the impending risk may be a relevant factor in the assessment of
the relative weights of plaintiff and defendant fault as set forth in
Watson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Co.20 While the scheme
set forth in Murray is perhaps analytically useful to Louisiana's factreviewing appellate judiciary, the retention of assumption of risk as a
question of fact, with its legal consequences under comparative fault,
would have been easier for the practicing bar, the trial court, and the
jury to administer.
Howard v. Allstate Insurance Co.,21 indicates that culpability under
the Loescher-style strict liability is different in kind from culpability
accompanying contributory negligence and, hence, is insusceptible of
comparison for comparative fault purposes. Howard requires that in
such disparate culpability cases the jury must compare causation rather
than fault. The opinion cites provisions of the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act 22 as the source of such a comparison. This Act admonishes
that the trier of fact should always consider both causation and fault

19.
20.
21.
22.
in 1977.

324 So.
469 So.
520 So.
Adopted

2d 441.
2d 967 (La. 1985).
2d 715 (La. 1988).
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
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in comparing culpability because it is intellectually impossible to separate
the two for the purpose of allocating responsibility to the various parties.
It seems theoretically impossible for a party to be only sixty percent
negligent. Negligence ought to be a character of fault that is entered
into and achieved wholly or not at all. If one is said to be sixty percent
negligent, we might also say he is very nearly at fault. On the other
hand, as between a wrong-turning motorist and a non-observant oncoming motorist, it is apparent that each is one hundred percent negligent, but that each in some factually determinable degree shared in
the causation. Thus, realistically, it is the causation that should be
apportioned between the two, not the fault.
Whether fortuitously or through uncanny prescience, the redactors
of Code of Civil Procedure article 1812(C)(1), (2) and (3) covered, in
a very practicable sense, the possibilities for the juries. The article
provides that the jury should find whether a party was at fault, and if
they were, whether such fault was a legal cause of the damage. It further
provides that the degree of fault should be expressed in a percentage.
Even though the article calls for the degree of fault as a percentage,
the evaluation of whether such fault was a legal cause probably blends
these two concepts in the jury's mind.

